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In a book outlining how best to give shape and momentum to a re-invigorated Left, in 
Arts of the Political Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift present a vision that on the face of it 
has much to commend it, one which emphases not just potential, passion and 
possibility but also pluralism, principle and practicality. But it’s a vision that they 
have chosen to tie so closely to a very specific, almost wilfully obtuse interpretation 
of a rather narrow range of academic theory that, by the end, they feel obliged to 
reassure their readers that they are not recommending “a politics of bio-cultural 
engineering” (p.199). If you have to say this sort of thing out loud, at the end of your 
book, it does suggest that somewhere along the line in what has come before you 
might well have given the impression that this is exactly what you are suggesting. The 
sense that the authors have not taken quite enough time to reflect on the coherence, 
consistency or full implications of what they are arguing is pervasive as one reads 
through this book.
The book comes surrounded by a certain kind of atmosphere. In the mid-
2000s, Amin and Thrift provoked a debate of sorts about the future of the Left in 
geography (see Amin and Thrift 2005; 2007). For their trouble, they were publicly 
castigated for providing apologetics for neoliberalism and were also darkly accused of 
wielding undue and unaccountable influence in shaping the agendas of academic 
Geography in the UK (judging by the paucity of references to Geographers in the 1
book under review, this presumption of influence is not necessarily shared by the 
authors). No doubt, the arguments in this book will resonate differently in Geography 
compared to other fields. Amin and Thrift’s argument now is not at all about the Left 
in Geography, but about the Left in general (or at least, and in a wholly untenable self-
restriction, to the Left in ‘the West’). Because Arts of the Political has this ambition to 
redefine the tasks of the Left, there is an inevitable temptation to get caught up in 
questions of whether or not Amin and Thrift’s vision is Left enough, or genuinely 
Left. Others will be both better qualified and more motivated than I to judge the book 
in these terms. As far as is possible, I want to try to maintain a focus on the mode of 
argumentation deployed in this book. This may appear to be an act of folly. But the 
question of whether or not one should align oneself with the specific vision of Left 
politics that Amin and Thrift present is strictly dependent on the question of how 
much credence you are willing to extend to their account of the dynamics of 
contemporary political practice.
The book consists of seven chapters, top and tailed by a Prologue and an 
Epilogue. It starts with a claim that the Left needs to rethink what politics is and what 
it can be; in short, it needs “to repopulate the political with new visions, new desires 
and new modes of organization” (p.ix). The Left, we are told, has lost touch with the 
idea of politics as a process of world-making. The working definition of the Left used 
here is a little vague, although it gets fleshed out somewhat as things develop. To 
rediscover its world-making capacity, the Left needs to better understand and cultivate 
three distinct political arts: of imagination, persuasion and fulfilment. These three 
political arts of world-making - invention, affect and organisation - form the core 
structure of the book as its argument is unfolded. The threefold formula has certain 
degree of analytical lucidity that captures something important about the different 
dimensions along which politics, in general, is practiced. The three arts are further 
refined as “the ability to project new habitable environments out of latent injuries and 
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concerns, the ability to alter the means and terms of political conduct so that the latent 
can emerge with effective and affective energy, and the ability to develop the means 
of organization to sustain momentum and cement gains” (pp.xii-xiii).
Strictly speaking, this threefold formula does not specify these as distinctively 
Left political arts. In large part, in fact, their argument is that ‘the Right’ has been 
rather better at deploying these political arts in recent times. It should also be said that 
these three political arts are not accorded equal status. Affect, it will turn out, is the 
really important political art to appreciate and develop. Amin and Thrift provide a 
clue to how they will construe this particular political art when they suggest that 
political judgements “are not made in rational or deliberative ways; they follow key 
lines of emotion”. For them, it follows that “[m]any political impulses are contagious 
and require only momentary thought”, and, in turn, that the Left need to acknowledge 
that the science of influencing “these momentary decisions has become more and 
more exact” (p.14). Around this chain of assertion and implication, Amin and Thrift 
will weave a whole theory of contemporary political action and of the tasks of Left 
politics. The analysis in the book is shaped by a two-track argument, in which a 
general account of how the political field works is run alongside attempts to fill this 
account in with specifically Left impetus.
Little Known Facts About Well Known People
Having set out their stall quite clearly, Chapter 1, ‘The Grounds of Politics’, delves a 
little more deeply into the understanding of politics and the political at work in the 
book. The distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ has taken on a certain 
intellectual weight in some fields of Left theory. In what has become the predominant 
reading of the distinction in discussions of the ‘post-political’, ‘the political’ is 
reserved for a precious few acts or events of fundamental transformation and 
upheaval. This is a dull and uninteresting construal of what is an intuitively interesting 
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conceptual distinction when freed up from overly prescriptive interpretation. Happily, 
Amin and Thrift don’t fall into this trap. There is, they say, no need to presume that 
the political is restricted to either particular actors or particular forms of activity. They 
recommend the task of exploring instead “the continual reinvention of the political 
that occurs as a result of political action” (p.6), a view that presumes that the political 
is understood “not as a stable field but as a field whose form and content are 
continually redefined” (ibid.). This affirmation of the political as a variable effect of 
political action, rather than an a priori category or an ontological foundation offset 
against mere politics, shouldn’t be quite as notable as it is. But as I say, in the context 
of current usages, it is certainly welcome. In fact, the precise sense of the political 
used in the book is actually quite variable. Sometimes it is used to refer to fields of 
common or shared concern (and in this use, too easily conflated with the concept of 
public, with unfortunate implications); sometimes it is used to refer to a field of 
dispute and contestation, but without excluding compromise and negotiation; and 
sometimes it is used to refer to a field of intervention and concerted action.
Having posited that the content and form of politics is open to change, Amin 
and Thrift proceed to outline their case that the task facing the Left is to open up new 
understandings of the political. This is the task they refer to as world-making: “To be 
clear, what we mean by world-making capacity is the ability to produce what Peter 
Sloterdijk has called ‘atmospheres’, that is, spaces of resonance in which the oxygen 
of certain kinds of thought and practice seems natural and desirable” (p.5). Let it be 
said that this is not any sort of clarification at all. Suffice to say that world-making is 
meant to capture the sense of politics as a practice of re-defining issues, actors, stakes 
and interests that populate the political field.
Amin and Thrift close this first chapter by defining their book as “akin to a 
political primer” (p.9). If the description of the book as a primer suggests that the 
book will introduce readers to a new area in an accessible fashion, then think again. 
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Clarifying what they mean by ‘primer’, the authors say that hope will “prime new 
kinds of political thinking and practice” (p.16). The book’s frame of intellectual 
reference is actually remarkably narrow, defined by proper names such as Bruno 
Latour, Isabelle Stengers and Graham Harman, William James, Gilles Deleuze and 
Peter Sloterdijk, as well as by selective reference to the long tail of modern French 
thought that now includes Gabriel Tarde and Gilbert Simondon. Often cited, briefly 
quoted, none of these thinkers is given any kind of adequate ‘explication’. The 
favoured genre of theoretical exegesis adopted in this book is that of the bibliographic 
essay: rather than a detailed analysis or even outline of ideas, there are a succession of 
allusions, sometimes accompanied by attempts at clarification which, as already 
indicated, tend only to muddy the waters further. If this book is a primer, then it is a 
primer meant only for those who are already attuned to this particular intellectual 
habitus.
Chapter 2, ‘Leftist Beginnings’, sets out to establish the historical reference points 
against which the Left today will be for the most part unfavourably compared. It 
identifies four examples of Left movements that succeeded in the task of ‘world-
making’ laid out in the opening chapter. The four examples are all drawn from the 
period from the 1880s through to 1914: the rise of the German Socialist Party; 
Swedish social democracy; the growth of the British women’s movement; and the 
Progressive movement in the United States. None of these, of course, is a classically 
revolutionary movement. Far from it, they are exemplary examples of reformist 
politics. Each is marked by a concern with elections, party formation, coalition 
building. For Amin and Thrift, they exemplify ‘pragmatic utopianism’, and each one 
if also credited with having successfully “intuited the arts of invention, affect and 
organization needed to fashion and deliver a program of radical reform by working on 
the very nature of what it meant to be political” (p.19).
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In the overall argument of the book, these four examples stand as the models 
which succeeded in ushering onto the political scene “new historical subjects, new 
technologies of organisation and resistance, new visions of the good life and social 
possibility, new definitions of human subjectivity and fulfilment, and new spaces of 
the political” (p.35). This is, then, a motivated deployment of Left nostalgia in the 
cause of advancing a particular vision of contemporary Left politics. One might well 
quibble with the selections, as well as with their precise interpretation in this chapter. 
Could the authors really not think of equally compelling examples of ‘pragmatic 
utopianism’ from sometime in the last 100 years? Or from outside of ‘the West’? One 
notes, too, that each of these movements succeeded primarily by pursuing politics 
within a national frame. I suspect that if one is only looking for analogies of this type 
of political practice, then you might well miss quite a lot of the effective world-
making activity of the contemporary Left.
The examples presented in this chapter become the benchmark against which 
the inadequacies of ‘today’s Left’ are compared as the book proceeds. ‘The Left 
today’ has lost the capacity to re-shape political imaginations and institutionalise 
programmes of reform, a capacity which these four movements exemplify. Here, as 
throughout, the argument of the book has to tread the thin line between affirming the 
vibrancy of contemporary Left politics while also calling it to task for lacking the will 
as well as the skill of making its concerns ‘resonate’ and ‘amplify’. In its historical 
focus, this chapter does remain true to the principle outlined at the start of discerning 
reconfigurations of the political by attending closely to the dynamics of political 
action. As the argument proceeds on from this chapter, this principle is rapidly 
abandoned. For the rest of the book, redefinitions of the political will be deduced from 
a range of very academic social theory and philosophy; and this theoretical sourcing 
of redefinitions of the political will be supplemented by derivations that privilege the 
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causal rationalities of particular fields of business and commercial practice as best 
disclosing the emergent lineaments of the political.
Chapter 3, ‘Reinventing the Political’, lays out the distinctive ontology of the pre-
personal and the non-human that Amin and Thrift present as disclosing the new 
configurations of the political to which the Left needs to orient itself. This chapter 
abandons the sense that reinventions of the political are best disclosed by attending 
closely to political action. It presents, instead, a resolutely scholastic, monological 
deduction of new understandings of what counts as political from selected strands of 
social theory and philosophy.
The starting point for this foundational chapter is the argument that we need to 
move beyond the focus on the subject of politics as “human being unfolding in time”. 
We are told that what is needed is to rethink “the being in human being as a constant 
process of becoming”, in ‘the style of’ Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson, James and 
Whitehead. I’m not quite sure what this ‘style’ exactly is, or what distinguishes the 
recommended ‘style’ of thinking of human being as a process of becoming from the 
style of thinking about processes of becoming one finds in Hegel, say, or in Marx, or, 
closer to home, in David Harvey? Personally, I think arguments that stake so much on 
the novelty of thinking in terms of becoming should be treated with deep suspicion - 
somewhere lurking therein will be a straw-figure waiting to be easily knocked over. 
The more resonant point Amin and Thrift want to develop is that all sorts of non-
humans have been shown to play quite active roles in the performance of social life - 
animals, plants, bacteria, the climate. As this brief list suggests, there is a degree of 
incoherence about just what makes up the non-human, but let’s leave that aside.
Amin and Thrift ask us to ponder the political relevance of this extension of 
the scope of the social: “What if we were to admit actors who traditionally have been 
regarded as objects of political attention but rarely as subjects?” (p. 40). It’s a good 
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question, if you slow down long enough to think seriously about how to go about 
answering it. It is, amongst other things, a question that should help us see that ‘the 
human’ is a political concept of remarkably recent purchase: ‘the human’ emerges as 
an ethical and political figure in the process whereby working people, colonised 
peoples, women, sexual minorities, and other exploited and marginalised 
constituencies lay claim to a degree of symmetry, shall we say. In large part, ethical 
and political concern with non-humans coincides historically with the emergence of 
this reconstitution of the political around the figure of the human. I make the point to 
suggest that the self-legitimising narrative of political ontologies of the non-human, 
indebted to the somewhat partial genealogies of our non-modernity presented by 
Bruno Latour, might be interpreted somewhat differently. There is, after all, nothing 
more humanist than worrying about the well-being of animals, or the future of the 
planet. And I also make this point because the challenge of thinking about the ‘non-
human’ dimensions of political life might well require a rather more careful, more 
sensitive elaboration of what it means to be human, as distinct from an account of 
human being, than is found anywhere in this book.
In raising the question of what political difference it makes to think of the 
material constitution of social life in the extended way developed by actor-network 
theory, science and technology studies, and assemblage theory, Amin and Thrift do 
not pause to consider whether one should even suppose that one can derive a view of 
either politics or the political from ontologies of materiality, actants, and assemblages; 
much less from philosophical speculations about ‘reality’. The idea that a view of 
assembled, heterogeneous qualities of ‘the social’ has a straightforward political pay-
off turns on a familiar conceit of social science. Amin and Thrift tell us that “liberal 
political theory” tends to privilege rational decision making by free-thinking and 
sovereign individuals. Then we are told that this view is challenged by recalling “the 
simple biological facts that dictate that human beings are always interdependent, 
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reliant on the other for sustenance and survival” (pp.41-42). It is not at all clear that 
political theories, liberal or otherwise, that work through issues of individual 
sovereignty, autonomy, or rational decision-making are straightforwardly invalidated 
by simply invoking either natural or social facts about interdependence and 
relationality. As political theories, they are probably better thought of as starting off 
from an acknowledgement of relational dependence, vulnerability, and unintended 
consequences. Which direction they move off in from there, in thinking through how 
to live with these facts, is a more complicated question no doubt. But the type of 
superiority presumed by social theoretical arguments is prone to misrepresent 
irreducibly normative questions as questions open to easy resolution by ontological 
trumping of the sort that Amin and Thrift indulge in here.
Having set up their liberal straw figure in this familiar way, Amin and Thrift 
move quickly on to suggest that we need to think of rationality in different ways. We 
are told that there is “an enormous debate” (p.42) about higher order thinking, and 
then they reel off a four-line list of what is included. We are told the names of thinkers 
who have challenged ‘Western’ notions of personhood too. But Amin and Thrift don’t 
slow down to ‘explicate’ the details of these debates or these thinkers work. This 
discussion, as with much else, reads more like the first draft of a discussion, with 
hanging, unglossed quotations and rushed allusions to this debate or that. In parts, the 
style reads like notes-to-self. Often enough, the authors acknowledge that there are 
lots of precedents for the arguments they are nevertheless presenting as novel and 
challenging in new ways. For example, Amin and Thrift recognise that what they 
insist on calling ‘affect’ has been a concern of political thought since at least the time 
of Hobbes (pretty much from the start of ‘liberal political theory’ then). They then 
evidence this point by mentioning work in philosophical aesthetics: “Think only of 
the work of Immanuel Kant on the sublime” (p.46). We are offered no more details on 
Kant, or the sublime. This is a recurrent rhetorical tic in this book - ‘Think of X on 
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Y…’. It illustrates the more general tone of knowingness that characterises the 
elaboration of the argument. For example, the writer whose work is, by my count, 
most frequently cited and quoted in this book is Isabelle Stengers. Nowhere does one 
learn who Stengers is or what her work is about. My point is not, necessarily, to doubt 
that Stengers’ work can inform interesting discussions of politics. It’s just that one 
would have thought that one might learn a little more about how, in this case, work in 
the philosophy of science should be and has been translated into interpretations of 
political practice.
The lesson from this run through of the inadequacies of ‘a large part of 
political theory’ is that we need to abandon the idea that people simply pick-up 
political ideas and behaviour, reflect on them and then act (pp.44-45). It will become 
clear, as the book proceeds, that the primary objection to this view is to the idea that 
political action depends on ideas and beliefs, not to the sense that politics is a 
succession of punctual points of action. The input-output view of action is actually 
retained; it is just going to be filled with affective content. In introducing the idea of 
affect (pp.46-47), Amin and Thrift give the very strong impression of endorsing the 
strong interpretation of a sharp, categorical divide between affect and emotion (and, 
by extension, between affect on the one side and reasoning and rationality on the 
other). They certainly make no acknowledgment of the ‘enormous debate’ on the 
adequacy of this relentlessly dualistic interpretation of the significance of ‘affect’.
The chapter now moves onto two related sections, ‘Welcome to the World of 
the Pre-Personal’ and ‘Welcome to the World of the Non-Human’. Taken together, 
these two sections provide the basis for a “psychotopical” perspective on the ways in 
which space matters in processes of world-making. The first of these sections 
elaborates a view of there being “planes of existence” and “layers of thinking” that are 
not open to conscious inspection or cognitive articulation. By reference to a 
hotchpotch of ideas including Drew Western’s account of ‘the political brain’, 
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Maurizio Lazzarato’s account of immaterial labour and subjection, and Benjamin 
Lisbet’s psychological experiments, this section develops an account of what it calls, 
interchangeably, the “pre-individual”, the “pre-cognitive”, and the “pre-verbal” 
components of subjectivity. At one level, this is all about acknowledging the degree to 
which a great deal of human life is practice-oriented, and in turn, not presuming that 
non-cognitive dimensions of human life are ‘irrational’. This is all to be commended, 
no doubt. It is not clear, however, that what all this work amounts to is the conclusion 
that “very large amounts of human activity lie outside of what we consider ‘our’ 
control”, but that they lie instead “in a layer of thinking that is not open to conscious 
introspection” (p.51). We need to slow down here. It is one thing to say that, in the 
flow of action, one might not be aware of or in control of all influences at work. That 
much might actually be rather obvious. But this feature of action is, of course, open to 
conscious reflection, and that much is evidenced by Amin and Thrift’s discussion of 
it, and by all the work they cite in the course of that discussion. The question of how 
one posits the relationship between what, for the sake of argument, we can call the 
unreflective qualities of action and the knowing, reasoned dimensions of action is the 
subject of ‘enormous debate’. One would not have thought so judging from the 
discussion in Arts of the Political.
Collapsing debates from very different fields of inquiry together, and 
subjecting them to a political interpretation, leads somewhat inevitably to a 
straightforward claim that things going on in a zone of ‘pre-personal’ antecedents 
modulate political action. The lesson to be taken away is that human being “comes 
jam packed with uncertainty” and that the “rational, political citizen only ever fitfully 
reaches the surface of action” (p.53), since political agency is ‘offset’ by “all manner 
of pre-personal currents”. There are various things one could say about this account of 
the pre-personal. One might be tempted, given its dependence on an influential 
interpretation of Deleuzian-inflected theories of affect, to refer to critiques of this 
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approach that question the authoritative reference to science that often characterises 
this work (e.g. Leys 2011). But strictly speaking, these criticisms do not apply here, 
since apart from the passing reference to Lisbet’s ‘half-second delay’ experiments, the 
authority that Amin and Thrift invoke is wholly drawn from specific fields of 
philosophy and cultural theory. One might notice too that there is a conflation 
involved in moving so rapidly from accounts of embodied action drawn from fields 
such as psychology and phenomenology to an argument about the nature of political 
action. This conflation only works if one is willing to believe that political action is 
best modelled on the types of circumscribed performance from which understandings 
of action in such fields are derived.
The interpretation of affect that underwrites the strong claim about just how 
much political action is configured by pre-personal currents is dependent on a very 
particular temporal framing of the issues at hand. Despite the fact that this section 
refers also to the idea of human action as being “fundamentally prosthetic”, and that 
human beings are not necessarily best thought of as bounded by their skins, the 
overwhelming emphasis is on a straightforward ordering of temporal priority: before 
actions that show up as conscious or willed, comes all this activity in a prior, 
antecedent realm (where the precise sense of priority involved is itself rather 
variable). The temporal framing of affect is quite fundamental to the account of 
contemporary formations of political life that this book outlines in its later stages, and, 
no less important, for the view of Left politics that the authors recommend on the 
basis of that account.
The dualistic, temporal framing of affect as an order of not just analytical but 
causal priority in ‘Welcome to the World of the Pre-Personal’ is followed by the 
second of the two key sections of this chapter. In ‘Welcome to the World of the Non-
Human’, we are introduced to a range of work that has sought to articulate the politics 
of various non-humans, from animals to plants to objects in general. Once again, it’s a 
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rapid ride through some wild terrain, taking in issues such as the role of animal labour 
in Marxist theories of primitive accumulation, of chemical alterations of states of 
mind, and the political history of barbed wire. As long as one is willing to restrict the 
term ‘agency’ to the preferred sense used in much of this type of work (a sense of 
having effects, doing things, making a difference; or more interestingly, bearing some 
type of responsibility), then the account of non-human agency is challenging without 
stretching one’s credulity too far. The key point of this range of work, and of this 
section of Arts of the Political, is the distribution of agency across whole networks or 
systems of people, machines, animals, circulations, things, and circuits. “Actant” is 
the preferred term for the participants in accounts of distributed agency. It’s really just 
a technical term for character, that is, for any personified subject in an extended moral 
narrative in which ascriptions of responsibility, liability and accountability are at 
stake. It’s a concept that might well require one to assume that the best way to think of 
distributed agency is on analogy with fairy tales and mythological narratives. It might, 
in short, smuggle in a distinctively humanist imaginary behind the scenes when used 
to describe configurations of social life that include non-humans.
Amin and Thrift locate their synthesis of various streams of thought on the 
non-human by telling us that “mainstream thought” worries about whether or not 
things exist independently or are constructed by the mind, as if most of us are all 
trapped inside Descartes’ thought experiments. They prefer, they tell us, “the non-
correlationist view” according to which all that exists “is a legion of actants, which 
have no interior kernel or essence but are defined by and through their often 
ramshackle and quarrelsome alliances with others that need work to achieve” (pp.56-
57). If you are in the know, you will get the allusion to ‘correlationism’; if not, never 
mind. If you are in the know, you might also recognise in this passage the rhetoric of 
friend making and negotiation that characterises work inflected by actor-network 
theory especially. You might pause, perhaps, and notice that a social theory that seeks 
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to affirm the place of non-human actants in an extended view of social practices does 
so through a recurrent rhetoric that is already a drawn-out political analogy: what 
shows up as agency in this view of non-human dynamics is whatever contributes to 
successful coalition-formation and whatever can be shown to be capable of mediating 
diplomatic relations. There is, in short, more than a little humanistic priming in this 
sort of account of the non-human, which allows it in turn to be given such clear 
political inflections. In their elaboration of actor-network theory, assemblage theory, 
science and technology studies, and ideas from object-oriented ontologies, the authors 
do little to either address or allay some of the worries one might have about the strong 
claims for the political salience of such work. Should one, for example, really seek to 
re-model political life on rosy views of science as a benevolent process of 
experimentation and modification? Or, to take another worry, what is one to make of 
the frequency with which arguments about the need to recognise the autonomous 
status of non-humans as political subjects rapidly devolve into arguments that 
aggrandise the role of experts as representatives of those subjects?
In these two pivotal sections of this quite pivotal chapter, two quite distinct 
logical geographies of action are on display. The discussion of non-human agency is 
shaped by a focus on the spreading, dispersal, and distribution of action across a range 
of actants. The modularity of action that is supposed here, as well as in discussions of 
the prosthetics of human life, is a horizontal one. It is an emphasis Amin and Thrift 
themselves underscore by talking about politics in terms of making connections and 
linkages. It is a view that emphasises the way in which we are surrounded, 
accompanied, linked up with all sorts of other stuff, with whom we act in concert. It is 
a view of action shared across a range of debates around notions of, for example, the 
extended mind, distributed cognition, cognitive ecologies, and cognition in practice, 
to name just a few of a whole family of related concepts. One of the fundamental 
points to arise from this literature is the view that there is no reason to assign either 
14
causal or analytical priority in advance to any specific dimension of action - to 
rational thought, learned skills, emotional registers, material artefacts, genre 
conventions and so on. In contrast to this horizontal imagination, the account of the 
pre-personal dimensions of action that Amin and Thrift provide is framed by a quite 
different logical geography, in which a vertical modularity of action is privileged: 
there are layers and planes of experience, and some of these kick-in prior to others, 
priming them before cognition or reflection. Despite its popularity, there is no good 
reason to take this vertical framing of the temporal priority of affect all that seriously. 
Why not think of the any required de-centring of highly rationalist-cognitivist 
accounts of mind, perception, and consciousness in horizontal terms as well?
The point of drawing attention to the two different logical geographies of 
action at play in this chapter, and to suggest that they are somewhat at odds with each 
other, is that it is the vertical interpretation of orders of priority which has the upper 
hand in the account of the political that follows. Specifically, as the book develops, it 
is the attribution of temporal priority to an autonomous zone of affect that 
overdetermines the view presented of the ways in which the horizontal distribution of 
agency across mediated, built and designed spaces of interaction is managed for 
political ends.
The introduction to the pre-personal and the non-human leads on to an 
elaboration of the relevance of space for the political. Here, the understanding is one 
of “space as the flow of being itself” (p.65), associated with a definition of “terrain” 
as a sensory and knowing field which serves not just as a background or resource for 
action but is itself an actor too. Terrain, as a term of political analysis, is meant to be 
different from ‘environment’. To understand the difference, we are told we need to 
“move on from Heidegger to Peter Sloterdijk. This may seem to be a trivial move. It 
is not” (ibid.). I’m willing to believe it isn’t a trivial move, but wait, who is this 
Heidegger guy? He has been mentioned by name once before this point in the book, 
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and neither then nor here or subsequently do we get told what it is in his work that we 
need to move on from. Which means that, though we do get told what Sloterdijk 
thinks, we are told nothing to allow us to appreciate the non-triviality or otherwise of 
his thought. Sloterdijk provides us, it turns out, with a series of spatial figures of 
being-together, or ‘spheres’. They are, as Amin and Thrift quote him saying, the 
dynamic spaces of coexistence which attest to the fact that human existence “is 
anchored in an insurmountable spatiality” (p.65). What seems to be at stake here is an 
attempt to disclose, one might say, the contexts or situations of living and action into 
which we find ourselves always already thrown. By glossing it like that, I suspect I 
might well be contravening some secret understanding of the difference that 
Sloterdijk’s account of spheres makes to a more run-of-the-mill Heideggerian 
vocabulary, but as I have pointed out, this is not my fault - Amin and Thrift have not 
‘explicated’ the difference for the reader.
What is really significant, apparently, about Sloterdijk is the idea of there 
being a “politics of psychotopical tuning”. This idea provides the answer to the 
question of the relevance of the preceding discussion in this chapter for “...broadening 
our sense of what is political and thus...instituting new kinds of Leftist politics” 
(p.67). (Notice, again, that we have now departed quite clearly from any sense that it 
is politics that reveals new dimensions of the political; we have reversed things, so 
that it is Theory that discloses the understandings of the political.) This politics of the 
psychotopical refers to the means by which new political spaces can be identified, 
new “immunities” can be formed and new “atmospheres” can be cultivated. Or, to put 
it another way, the place where ‘priming’ goes on. To summarise, what this notion of 
psychotopical tuning comes down to is the idea that politics needs to be understood as 
“the art of generating affective fields”. It is a view that sees various designed spaces 
as configuring perceptions, smuggling in values and orientations, and full of potential 
for creative imitation and viral communication. This is all presented in rather 
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breathless style, it should be said, and it is not clear that the directions for further 
exploration that are identified at the close of this chapter are, as promised, followed 
up in the rest of the book. The apparent political potential of this range of spatial 
practices is dependent in large part on the authors’ accepting at face-value the causal 
rationalities that shape professional self-understandings in various fields of art, media, 
design, and other arenas in which space is conceptualised first and foremost not just 
as a medium of communication but of communicability. We have now reached the 
point where the dimensions of political life awaiting to be worlded by the Left are 
best disclosed through the unlikely alliance of high Theory and various cutting-edge 
forms of high-tech, soft capitalist business practice. We will have to await chapter 7 of 
this book to see exactly how this combination will help us imagine a “post-human and 
postrational” politics.
Chapter 4 of Arts of the Political shifts register somewhat, moving attention from the 
authors’ favoured theoretical traditions to a review of five streams of ‘Contemporary 
Leftist Thought’: anti-capitalist neo-Marxisms; what they call reformist Left 
positions; post-capitalist positions associated with various types of post-structuralist 
ideas; what the authors characterise as work concerned primarily with human ethics; 
and work on public making. Amin and Thrift take their distance most clearly from the 
first of these, and find things to like in the others - a commitment to the continuing 
relevance of the social state, or to institutional experimentation, or to alternative 
ethical practices, or to making new issues public (see also Amin 2012). Nevertheless, 
the presumption of the chapter, and where it fits in with the overall narrative of the 
book, is that while these different streams of thought illustrate that the Left has lots to 
say about the current state of the world, it has lost the world-making capacity 
discussed in chapter 2 to reformulate political space and generate new ambitions for 
the future. This judgement might well depend on presenting these streams of thought 
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as merely that - just streams of thought. Not much effort is made to connect them to 
any actually existing Left politics with which they might well be in dialogue. Amin 
and Thrift suggest the first three strands of contemporary Left thought lack 
practicality, and that the last two lack substantive Left content. The problem really 
seems to be that none of them seems to have managed to scale-up their practical 
achievements to the level posited as a model in chapter 2. So the conclusion of the 
chapter, namely that this review of Left thought further illustrates that the Left has lost 
“its ability to imbue the new with power and conviction” (p.108), is not really a 
diagnosis so much as an assertion. In a sense, the authors could hardly be expected to 
say anything else, since the momentum of their book is precisely to provide a strategy 
meant to make up for this absence, one based on the theoretical analysis developed in 
chapter 3. Of these five streams, it is only the final one - exemplified by William 
Connolly’s vitalistic reconstruction of pluralism, and Latour’s ‘object-oriented’ model 
of democracy - that will have any further resonance as the book proceeds (and 
Connolly, it turns out, is still a little too “humanist”, never a good thing in this 
intellectual universe).
Amin and Thrift seem to acknowledge throughout this chapter that there are 
resources of value to their project in these other traditions. But having negotiated the 
tension between lots of Left ideas and supposed a lack of world-making force, they 
end by announcing that in fact “the Left has to start again from scratch, substantively 
and procedurally, gathering issues yet to be named; inventing new political 
technologies; speaking for publics gathered around new disputations of truth, fact and 
opinion; and making just cause that many can see and many can support” (p.108). 
There is, as you can see, a degree of hubristic ambition animating Arts of the Political.
How to Stop Worrying and Start Living
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 make the case for the importance of the three political arts, and 
most especially, for the inventive potential of world-making. The historical 
illustrations are the most convincing element of this overall case. The diagnosis of the 
lack or loss of world-making capacity by the Left, in chapter 4, is largely made at the 
level of assertion rather than demonstration. And as I have suggested, chapter 3 
locates the sources of re-invented ideas of what counts as political primarily in social 
theory and philosophy. Chapters 5 and 6 of the book shift to a focus on the art of 
organisation. They are provocative in so far as some significant part of contemporary 
Left thought is indeed rather averse to thinking through questions of organisation and 
institutionalisation as anything other than unfortunate impositions on the purity of 
spontaneous action, and they do not shy away from thinking of the state as retaining 
considerable potential for the realisation of Left politics.
Chapter 5, ‘Organising Politics’, seeks to recuperate the state as a space of 
Left political possibility. That such a task is even necessary might require a little 
explanation. The inability to think of organisation, institutionalisation, and state-
practices as having such potential is really an index of a failure to think through the 
meaning of democracy as a practice of rule rather than a pure mode of being; but 
that’s for another day. Amin and Thrift focus on literatures on spatial practices and on 
bureaucracy to develop an account of what they call statecraft as an open, contingent 
array of performances that contain all sorts of opportunities for Left politics to take 
root. What’s most effective about this discussion is the explicitly political 
interpretation of what one might call various forms of organisational materialism, to 
borrow a phrase from Michael Mann, found in theoretical literatures on 
governmentality, state formation, and anthropologies of the state. Emphasising the 
contingencies of state practice implies that there is much more scope for progressive 
politics in and through statecraft than is supposed. This discussion bought to my mind 
various related ideas, for example, James Ferguson’s recent account of ‘Left 
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governmentality’ (Ferguson 2010), Partha Chatterjee’s (2011) account of ‘political 
society’, work on the ‘prosaic state’ (Painter 2006) and work on how citizens ‘see the 
state’ (Corbridge et al. 2005). Such work also underscores the idea of the state as a 
disparate field of open political struggle rather than a monolith either to be resisted or 
captured. Amin and Thrift invoke John Keane’s (2009) analysis of ‘monitory 
democracy’ to illustrate how the contingency of state practices opens spaces in which 
new forms of accountability and scrutiny can be enforced through civil society actors. 
The relevance of work like Keane’s, or that of those other writers just mentioned, lies 
of course in the emphasis it places not just on the contingency of state forms per se, 
but on how contingent patterns of interaction between states and non-state actors are 
the key determinant of the politics of state practices.
Chapter 5 proceeds on to a cautious defence of the political potential of 
bureaucracy, via a discussion of not just Max Weber but also of Pierre Bourdieu as 
well as Paul du Gay. Taken together with the argument about state practices, this adds 
up to an argument in favour of thinking of states as “living, breathing things, 
miscellanies of institutions whose concrete direction is never set by that fact that they 
are the focus of a host of bureaucratic practices” (p.127). This affirmation underwrites 
the quite clear demarcation by the authors’ of their position from one that would 
disavow not just the state but organisation more generally as a requirement for 
effective political action. The point is well enough made, but it turns out that the 
affirmation of organisation is quickly reduced to a story about the modulation of 
affective milieu and the creation of new collectivities through “resonance chambers”. 
The point noted above, about how the political potential of states and bureaucracies 
depends on the interactive relationships with non-governmental actors and 
movements (never openly acknowledged as an implication of their own analysis), is 
completely elided under this eager embrace of the organisational tools and tactics to 
instrumentally create new ecologies of practice.
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In order to put further flesh on this argument about the importance of thinking 
organisationally about the limits and possibilities of Left politics, Chapter 6, provides 
a case study, focussing on ‘Eurocracy and its Publics’. This turns out to be an analysis 
of the ways in which policy initiatives in the European Union (EU) generate publics 
around complex technical issues - issues like water governance, biodiversity, and the 
information society. Of all the examples of contemporary organisational innovation 
one might choose to look at, the EU does not stand out as the most promising model 
for future Left politics. The EU certainly fits uneasily with a story about politics with 
focuses so heavily on questions of passion and emotion. The EU, rather famously, 
generates very little positive affective identification amongst its citizens. Taken in 
isolation, this chapter provides an interesting analysis of the way in which EU 
initiatives work. But in the context of this book’s argument, the choice takes on a 
more symptomatic resonance, shall we say, whose full significance is only really 
revealed as the argument reaches its full denouement in chapter 7. Rather than 
attending to the emergent formations and experimental practices one might find in 
various modes of contemporary Left practice associated with the ideas discussed in 
chapter 4, what the EU is a very good example of is a functioning political association 
in which bureaucracy is the dominant organising principle. It is presented here as a 
model for a form of “diplomatic” politics in which issues are raised and debated and 
then programmes implemented by expert-publics. The chapter is concerned with 
demonstrating the possibility of enlightened bureaucracy working for democratic ends 
and its role in conjuring into existence whole new fields of political action.
It should come as no surprise that an argument so heavily inflected by theories 
of ‘object-oriented’ democracy, non-human political subjects, and vitalistic 
materialisms should find itself making such an explicit case for politics as a 
bureaucratic, expert-led practice. It’s actually quite refreshing to have the link made 
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so explicitly. I don’t think this sort of argument is indefensible, far from it. I do think, 
however, that if one is to reach this point, depending as it does on a claim that “there 
is no democracy without representation (p.156), then one probably needs a much 
better understanding of the potentials and pitfalls of political representation than can 
be gleaned from Latour’s rather obvious declaration that ‘speaking’ always takes 
place through intermediaries of one sort or another. If one just settles for the sense that 
representation is a process of unavoidable mediation and translation that simply 
legitimises the role of ‘spokesperson’, then one has stopped the discussion precisely at 
the point at which all the really difficult issues arise (see Saward 2010).
Despite these reservations, chapters 5 and 6 are the strongest of the book, 
because they go against the grain of quite a lot of contemporary Left romanticism of 
direct action and pure activism, and also because they draw out some political 
distinctions that follow from certain strands of contemporary social theory of states, 
state-making, and the arts of government. But as I have said, the analysis presented in 
these two chapters is really just a preliminary to the argument of the final chapter of 
the book, chapter 7, ‘Affective Politics’. This chapter draws, the authors 
acknowledge, from Thrift’s (2007) single authored book Non-Representational 
Theory, and it synthesizes the component parts outlined in other chapters - 
psychotopical tunings, affective palettes, bureaucratic potentials - into an overarching 
vision of the tasks and mediums for effective Left politics.
The Little Recognized Secret of Success
The final chapter of Arts of the Political has a two-part structure which follows from 
the task that authors have set themselves, and the ways in which they have navigated 
through contemporary Left thought and practice to this point. The acknowledgement 
of creativity on the Left is a marginal theme throughout the book, but in order to sell 
the strong argument about what the Left most lacks and most needs, this emphasis 
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now disappears almost entirely. We are now presented with a truly dismal view of 
contemporary political life, one that depends on the folding together of the vertical 
construal of affect as a field of pre-personal priming with the horizontal imagination 
of material fields of action through which people constantly circulate. The bleak view 
that the authors present of a political field completely managed to realise 
“determinate” political outcomes is the prelude to an argument that what the Left 
needs to do is out-do the Right in deploying the machinery of affective politics. The 
chapter, in short, presumes that “affect precedes decision, rather than the other way 
round, and that in modern democracies, mastery of the means of affective capture is 
essential for making political gain” (p.158). What the Left therefore needs is to make 
better use than the Right of “the psycho-technologies that engineer collective feelings, 
but in a non-cynical way” (p.158). Somewhere along the way, what started out as an 
analysis of arts of the political has transmuted into an exploration of the instrumental 
deployment of various political technologies. I realise that the distinction between art 
and technique is never exact, but the drift is clear: political life, understood as a field 
of affective attunements, is something that needs to be subjected to better instrumental 
modulation.
The first part of this chapter outlines a vision of how the “affective 
machinery” of contemporary politics works to construct manipulated and stupefied 
publics. It reads in large part like a parody of Frankfurt School-style denunciations of 
the culture industry, just without the nuance or subtlety. However, the second part of 
the chapter turns on the contention that the Left does not need to hold out the hope of 
a more rational alternative, nor even of a critique of affective befuddlement of whole 
populations. Instead, it recommends that what it needs to do is “take a greater grip on 
the machinery of affective politics”: “What is needed is active cultivation of 
alternative feelings so that new affective connections can be forged and a general 
desire for other ways of being in the world can emerge, and can be built into new 
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political causes” (p.158). In order for this positive account of the tasks of Left politics 
to make any sense, Amin and Thrift have to paint a picture of the contemporary 
political field that is peopled by susceptible subjects completely open to “affective 
capture”. Forgetting an earlier point that affect needs to be understood as 
“determinedly indeterminate”, we are told that there is now a whole new level of 
political organisation that is “increasingly able to obtain determinate electoral results 
through the manipulation of affect” (p. 159). Notice how the discussion has become 
centred on a story about elections and voting. The idea that voting is the archetypal 
model of political action follows because it seems, on the face of it anyway, to lend 
itself to a discussion of momentary, punctual decisions. Voting therefore seems to fit 
the requirements of an account of how momentary decisions are preceded by various 
antecedent pre-personal, pre-cognitive, pre-verbal “vortices of influence”. (There are 
only two problems with this, of course: first, voting is hardly the only model of 
political action one might consider relevant; and second, voting is probably not best 
thought of as a momentary decision anyway.)
Amin and Thrift present a picture of contemporary public life as a product of 
the wilful “construction of commonplaces”. This view is premised on the argument 
that since human thought is never free from emotion, public thinking is basically 
imitative and shaped by semiconscious registers. The authoritative reference for this 
view is the work of Gabriel Tarde, whose great contribution we are told, was that “we 
only rarely control our own neural systems” (p.160). Has anyone ever thought 
otherwise? What Tarde apparently prepares us for is the need to face up to the issue of 
“automatism”. Hardly stopping to think, Amin and Thrift now present affect as a 
“semiconscious phenomenon, consisting of a series of automatisms, many of them 
developed in childhood, that dictate bodily movement” (p.161). Behaviour (we have 
long since slipped past the point where what is being described can be meaningfully 
called action) is shaped by a dynamic of suggestion and imitation that is largely 
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immune to the powers of reflection: “These automatisms may often feel like wilful 
action, but they are not, and they have powerful political consequences, not least 
because they form a kind of psychic immune system that means that certain issues can 
be avoided or perversely interpreted as a matter of course” (p.161). Politics is nothing 
other than the marshalling of susceptible publics this way and that: “it is relatively 
easy to promote in populations feelings of responsibility for events over which they 
could not possibly have had any purchase and, as a corollary, feelings of denial of 
their influence over events for which they quite clearly did have some influence” 
(p.161).
It’s difficult to know quite what to say in response to this type of claim, 
supported as it is by no examples or illustrations to indicate exactly what it is that the 
authors are talking about. We have by now slipped into an intellectual world where it 
seems any claim at all, however overblown or preposterous, can be justified by the 
preceding account of affective modulations and psychotopical tuning. Somewhere 
along the line, Amin and Thrift seem to have mislaid a distinction that Tarde, amongst 
others, was careful to maintain, which leads them to mistake publics for really big, 
extended crowds. They also seem to have mislaid their sense of proportion: “people 
have little or no agency over their bodies or environments but are under the control of 
affective forces. That is, they are powered by automatisms: the body is the medium 
for the transmission of force but usually without any conscious volition. Unconscious 
- or, rather, semiconscious - ‘thoughts’ cause the bulk of actions, including those 
associated with the political sphere” (p.161).
Amin and Thrift race on, calmly asserting that people are “powered by 
automatisms”, their actions “entranced” and “somnambulist”. The specific contexts in 
which these terms might maintain some semblance of coherence has been abandoned 
for an account of the generic object, affect, which underwrites a theory of public 
making as the instrumental manipulation of people’s commitments and attachments, 
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beliefs and desires. The term ‘automatism’ in this account draws on a simple, medical-
legalistic sense of actions undertaken unconsciously. There is, it should be said, an 
alternative sense of ‘automatism’ associated with modernist art, the surrealists most 
obviously, as well as in the cultural theories of Roland Barthes and Stanley Cavell. 
Here, automatism is a figure not for an opposition between the intentional and the 
automatic but for a redistribution of agency across mediums, genres, and skilful action 
(e.g. Armstrong 2012). It is, in short, a concept most creatively used in the humanities 
according to the kind of horizontal modularity of action that, I have suggested, is 
disavowed by Amin and Thrift’s relentless prioritization of an autonomous zone of 
affect. I make the point simply to indicate that there are alternative interpretations 
available of many of the ideas subjected to such singular construal in this book.
The emphatic argument about the priority of the passions over reason, emotion 
over intellect is linked to a melodramatic diagnosis of the current erosion of 
democracy. In support of this diagnosis, Amin and Thrift appeal in support to the 
argument of Walter Lippmann, who in the 1920s worried that the lack of 
epistemological competency amongst citizens threatened to undermine responsible 
democratic government. Lippmann’s scepticism about the wisdom of ordinary citizens 
and his defence of expert-led democratic elitism has certainly proved attractive to 
theorists of non-human, object-oriented political ontologies. To underscore the sense 
of impending threat faced by contemporary democracies, Amin and Thrift link 
Lippmann’s argument to Sheldon Wolin’s post-9/11 diagnosis of ‘totalitarian 
democracy’ in the United States. Wolin’s view of the purity of radical democracy is 
almost totally at odds with the position defended by Lippmann. The “threat to 
democracy” discerned by the two thinkers was hardly the same: for Lippmann, the 
people were the problem; Wolin is no populist romantic, but he locates the threat at 
the level of what we might want to call statecraft and bureaucracy gone awry. Splicing 
the two together makes for a rather incoherent narrative in which proper deliberation 
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is reduced to so many simulations by power of ‘the meeja’, without quite noticing that 
Lippmann didn’t seem to put great store in the potential of deliberation in the first 
place (or that nor have they either in the preceding discussion). Amin and Thrift 
suggest that Lippmann’s view about the threat to democracy is quite ‘prescient’ 
“whatever the exact pros and cons” of his argument. They don’t let us in on what 
those pros and cons might be. But surely one’s judgement of the exact pros and cons 
of the argument might well shape whether we find Lippmann’s view even faintly 
prescient, or whether we prefer to think of it as an artefact from the history of 
democratic elitism. Perhaps, for example, if we were to read John Dewey’s work on 
the public and its problems, cited elsewhere in this book but not mentioned as part of 
this discussion, we would notice its effective dismantling of Lippman’s premises, and 
be led away from thinking that public life is best thought of by reference to mid-
twentieth century laments about mass society.
If the “mass media” are the vehicle for circulating simulations of real 
democracy and hiding authoritarianism, then it also turns out that states and 
corporations are getting better and better at modulating what the authors refer to as 
“political moods”. The role of mood in politics has not been given enough attention, 
the authors claim, then say everyone from Max Weber to Paul Lazarsfeld to Lauren 
Berlant have given it plenty of attention. Then we are told that the classical field of 
Rhetoric is also best thought of as a resource for understanding the role of mood in 
politics. Moods, passions, rhetoric, emotions and feelings: these are not 
straightforwardly synonyms for each other, or for affect. While trying to corral them 
all into a singular account of the autonomy of affect, Amin and Thrift provide enough 
clues to suggest that the issues they are trying to cohere into a singular political 
ontology might always be given a very different gloss.
The important analytical claim arising from Amin and Thrift’s account of 
affective modulations, psychotopical tunings and automatisms is that people’s 
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predispositions are “increasingly available to be worked on and cultivated through a 
kind of performance management” (p.166). Exactly why this possibility is 
‘increasing’ is never quite explained. At points like this, the self-imposed, unjustified 
restriction of reference in this book to ‘the West’ seems to be important in sustaining 
this type of claim about the increasing resonance of technologically configured, 
media-saturated, designed environments identified by the authors. In fact, I suspect 
that the account of affect provided in Arts of the Political depends on an 
unacknowledged tradition of thinking about ‘the technological’ that might well be 
deeply ethnocentric, not least in its allusions to the difference of non-Western contexts 
(cf. Thrift 2009). What we do get told is that the growth of the “mass media” makes it 
much easier to work on the semiconscious realm. As if the reader has slipped through 
a portal back to the 1930s, it turns out that social theory is now once again concerned 
with defining the qualities of “mass experience”. To prove their point about the 
determinate efficacy of affective modulations, Amin and Thrift invoke as evidence the 
simple fact of political advertising. In three lines, they refer to Ronald Reagan’s 
upbeat campaign for re-election in 1984 and the Daisy advert used by the Johnson 
Presidential campaign against Barry Goldwater in 1964. The naming of these 
examples is meant to prove the point, without further elaboration. If you don’t know 
what they are referring too, bad luck. This would be weak journalism. It’s nonsense as 
academic argument. In a wonderful footnote, it is acknowledged that the Daisy advert, 
which overlaid a little girl picking flowers with a nuclear countdown and an H-Bomb 
mushroom cloud (i.e. it was hardly working on very deep levels of subtle suggestion), 
was actually only broadcast once. Nevertheless, we are assured, without any further 
evidence, that it was “still decisive”. It wasn’t.
I pick on this small example to give a flavour of the quality of argumentation 
that is used in this chapter, in which a remarkably dark and sinister image of 
contemporary politics is presented in order to justify a somewhat counter-intuitive 
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account of the tasks of Left politics. In a cascade of clichés, we are told that mass 
media, now understood as technologies of political mood, encourage the substitution 
of the consumption of democracy for the practice of democracy, of style for 
substance, personality and substance and perception for genuine debate. Politics has 
been “mass-mediatized”, and is now at the whim of political advertising, consultants, 
and the superficialities of retail politics. All of which, it is presumed, are highly 
effective in modulating affect via “mass media” to their own ends. Affect has now 
taken on the qualities of a noxious miasma, a causal vector that can be bent to the will 
of those ‘in the know’ - corporations, the Right, the state. And, if we are lucky, the 
benevolent Left as well. Because it turns out that the histrionic account of impending 
totalitarian democracy that is laid out at the start of chapter 7 is just a set-up for the 
suggestion that these political technologies of mood are also available to the Left: “If 
mediatisation is built into the political process the Left has to recognise that without 
it, there is no public or commonplace” (p.173). I daresay that the Left has known this 
for quite a while, without anyone ever conceptualising mediatization in a way that 
quite so overestimates the efficacy of affective modulations to bring off determinate 
effects.
The account of the desultory state of contemporary political life ends rather 
perfunctorily, and after the embrace of technologies of political mood is 
recommended, Amin and Thrift move without pause to the task of elaborating five 
“Leftist structures of feeling”, the values which should guide the deployment of 
affective technologies for non-cynical ends. In Raymond Williams’ original usage, a 
structure of feeling was something one identified through a kind of acquired 
discernment or analytical sympathy with what connected a body of works. The five 
structures of feeling Amin and Thrift outline are not identified through any such 
procedure as ‘emergent’ from any existing context of Left politics, to use another of 
William’s resonant keywords. It is difficult to object strongly to any of the five: 
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labour, which has a nice old fashioned ring to it; fairness, which is a little more 
abstract but also has a good solid Left pedigree; heterogeneity, which is just not going 
to catch on in the popular imagination, but tries to capture what might otherwise be 
called difference or diversity with a obligatory non-human twist; likewise 
accomplishment, which might just be better thought of by reference to a notion such 
as dignity; and steadfastness, which is has a rather moralistic ring to it. The listing of 
Leftist values comes couched in a vocabulary of “engineering” ethical dispositions 
and putting in place “machineries” of responsibility which has the effect of rather 
deflating the motivating force of this attempt to refine the content of Left politics. My 
feeling of scepticism was confirmed by the frankly weird end to this chapter, which 
declares that what has been demonstrated by the book as a whole is that “a new door 
has now been opened on motivation - one that the general population must be primed 
to go through” (p.186). This is a terrible mixed metaphor (do you prime people to go 
through doors?). That aside, it confirms the horribly restricted corner that Amin and 
Thrift seem to have talked themselves into - a place where the role of the Left is 
reduced to “working directly on affect” with the hope of reshaping the dispositions of 
“the general population” in favour of four or five rather randomly selected values.
Live Enthusiastically
Only the book does not quite end here. It has an Epilogue, which actually introduces a 
whole new layer of analysis. It lists a series of “major developments” of the past few 
decades that are the material upon which the Left might work. These include the 
global spread of the market economy, the financialization of everything, rising global 
inequality, global climate change, and technological reconfiguration of human life. It 
is not clear why these have had to wait to be discussed until the very end of the book, 
after the construction of a complex theoretical architecture. The Epilogue identifies a 
series of political responses and experiments that are associated with each of these 
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major developments. But these are simply listed in the columns of two tables. There is 
no supporting narrative gloss at all. This seems somehow exemplary of the book as a 
whole. The world of actual Left politics, of contestation, experimentation, 
mobilisation and even governance, is a kind of running marginal note never allowed 
to intrude too far into the theoretical construct being elaborated in the main narrative. 
None of the varied political movements or practical experiments listed in the Tables is 
allowed a theoretical voice: that is, they are never allowed to disclose the version of 
politics and the political that they enact in practice. The task of redefining the political 
has long since been reserved for selected philosophical traditions and favoured fields 
of contemporary business, consultancy and design practice.
And so it is that Amin and Thrift arrive at the end of their narrative, arguing 
that the main challenge of Left politics lies with “reworking human being”:
“What we know is that human beings are malleable and can be culturally and 
biologically produced. Let us say straight off that we are not heading towards a 
politics of bio-cultural engineering. But it cannot be denied that all human institutions 
form human conduct; therefore, there seems to be no reason not to intervene to 
cultivate different dispositions and personas. After all, education does this all the time. 
We could see a form of politics arising in which the disclosure of the multiple ways of 
human being is made more explicit and therefore open to self-fashioning in ways that 
are often denied currently. This would involve a combination of different arts and 
sciences that could refashion both body and environment to make ethical living and 
regard for others on the planet a strongly felt motivation” (p.199).
I quote this passage at length because it captures some of the muddle that 
characterises this book. Are we really still required to stake the possibility of political 
progress on theoretical deductions of the “malleability” of human subjects, for 
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example? And anyway, is malleability actually the correct lesson to learn from all the 
work about affect, the passions, and emotions referred to and alluded to in this book? 
The idea that the world is just there awaiting to be re-made in the favoured image of 
any political movement seems peculiarly at odds with the temper of our times, in 
which flows of power tend to work in the opposite direction: it is the concerns and 
grievances and worries of ordinary people that buffet concentrations of power this 
way and that, and which seem ever less amenable to straightforward modes of 
political modulation. And, isn’t the invocation of “education” here rather 
disingenuous? Education may, no doubt, be a transformative experience, but that 
tends to depend rather heavily on the presumed capacity for rational reflection and 
reasoned learning amongst the subjects of the process. Education is not, however one 
thinks of it, and however much one admits that passion and emotion might lie at its 
heart, a process that could be legitimately described, much less practiced, as one of 
affective modulation of pre-personal currents of influence or psychotopical tuning of 
spheres of suggestibility. The incongruity of the appeal to education here underscores 
the incoherence of the vision of Left politics presented in Arts of the Political, a vision 
which oscillates between a theoretical account in which people’s beliefs and desires 
needs to be modulated by an avant-garde of well-meaning Leftist artists, designers, 
and bureaucrats; and one in which the arbitrary hope is to carve out zones of 
reflection in which people will have time to slow down and consider matters properly.
Arts of the Political is a peculiarly disheartening book. It outlines what the 
authors refer to as a “mid-range” view of politics while leaving well behind the tenets 
of “middle-range” social theory - there is little scope left here for “the specification of 
ignorance” about issues which might well require further exploration or analysis (see 
Merton 1968: 68). What this book provides instead is a political vision premised on a 
systematic account of how whole fields of action, practice, technology, 
institutionalisation, accumulation, control, and programming hang perfectly together. 
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The book might have some influence in academic debates about the politics of affect 
or the non-human, but even here, I suspect there are rather more serious, nuanced 
interpretations of these themes to be found out there. One certainly wonders about the 
salience of its vision of Left politics, depending as it does so strongly on a theoretical 
narrative in which rational knowing has been completely evacuated from the field of 
everyday life, and reserved instead solely for a range of professional fields that think 
of themselves, at least, as better and better able to know what makes people really 
tick. This theoretical narrative sharply divides and then neatly redistributes knowing 
and feeling very clearly between different actors, and in so doing posits a specific 
kind of implied reader with whom some of the books’ arguments might well find 
some resonance. It is a view of life in which people’s actions are accounted for mainly 
in terms of things that get done to them without them knowing, and it leaves you with 
a vision of politics reduced at best to so many expert interventions and artistic 
experiments.
Arts of the Political has very little of substance to say about the state of 
contemporary Left politics. It presumes that the Left has much to learn from a rather 
narrow range of philosophy and social theory, and much to learn also from the causal 
rationalities of selected fields of business, commerce, consultancy, and design. It 
gives no impression that there is much to learn about the disclosure of new political 
futures from contemporary Left political practice. Call me old fashioned, but I think 
this might get things the wrong way around.
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